Should regulated retail electric utilities use ratepayer dollars to get into the EV charging business? I sense Kiesling will say no--but Law Prof. Adam D. Orford sez otherwise. See "Rate Base the Charge Space: The Law of Utility EV Infrastructure Investment," Columbia J. Enviro. Law. Maybe this is a Knowledge Problem post in the making?
My own $0.02: the Texas deregulated electricity market had little to do with the winter storm Uri failures BUT a lack of regulation by the Railroad Commission, the main overseer for gas, was a big factor. Basically, no Texas gas utilities weatherized and then when the storm hit the power producers, who purchase gas mostly on a spot basis, we’re SOL. Republicans tried to blame wind power but the wind turbines mostly performed to the level they were expected. A law was passed that pushed utilities to weatherize but Texas is no safer this winter then it was in 2021.
That's a great question!! There are more than two components to the response that are contributing factors in the outcomes of Uri:
The wholesale emergency and scarcity pricing construct
The gas/electric coordination during load shed
The simple fact that weather and other force majeure events will exceed design criteria of certain infrastucture. (i.e. 100% hurricane-proof transmission lines are cost prohibitive) but well-spent money on hardening assets against the events of higher likelihood is warranted.
Should regulated retail electric utilities use ratepayer dollars to get into the EV charging business? I sense Kiesling will say no--but Law Prof. Adam D. Orford sez otherwise. See "Rate Base the Charge Space: The Law of Utility EV Infrastructure Investment," Columbia J. Enviro. Law. Maybe this is a Knowledge Problem post in the making?
So well written! Thank you.
Did Texas’s success at creating competitive wholesale markets contribute to its failures in 2021? Or are the two issues separate?
My own $0.02: the Texas deregulated electricity market had little to do with the winter storm Uri failures BUT a lack of regulation by the Railroad Commission, the main overseer for gas, was a big factor. Basically, no Texas gas utilities weatherized and then when the storm hit the power producers, who purchase gas mostly on a spot basis, we’re SOL. Republicans tried to blame wind power but the wind turbines mostly performed to the level they were expected. A law was passed that pushed utilities to weatherize but Texas is no safer this winter then it was in 2021.
I agree with Rob, especially on the failures of the very-captured RRC.
There was a bizarre rant by RRC Chair Wayne Christian in late-2021 where he blamed renewables and thundered against the critical news coverage of the Commission’s reluctance to regulate gas firms. https://www.kxan.com/news/texas/fact-check-texas-railroad-commission-chair-blames-renewable-energy-for-unreliable-electric-grid/amp/
That's a great question!! There are more than two components to the response that are contributing factors in the outcomes of Uri:
The wholesale emergency and scarcity pricing construct
The gas/electric coordination during load shed
The simple fact that weather and other force majeure events will exceed design criteria of certain infrastucture. (i.e. 100% hurricane-proof transmission lines are cost prohibitive) but well-spent money on hardening assets against the events of higher likelihood is warranted.