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Eric Schubert's avatar

Rao, the reason is because ERCOT has an energy-only resource adequacy mechanism that supports bilateral contracting in retail choice. MISO is (mostly) cost-of-service regulation for retail customers across multiple states that mutes customers responses to price signals in the wholesale (RTO) market. PJM's capacity market also mutes customer responses in a different way.

The PUC of Texas adopted the energy-only approach, in part, based on the idea that appropriate locational and scarcity pricing would not only allow market participants to adopt new power technologies in waves, as economic history teaches us happens, but in ways that reinforces grid reliability and efficient market outcomes. The rise of energy storage in ERCOT is an example of that process.

The power industry as a whole, with its history of top-down regulation, didn't really have that mindset 20 years ago when some of the key market design decisions were made. Texas also had the advantage of adaptive governance, in the form of a nimble three-tiered decision-making process where the same group of stakeholders hashed out ideas for improving the ERCOT market as a whole. The rest of the country has had a more fragmented governance (state PUCs, multi-state RTOs, and FERC) not well-suited to incorporate rapid technological changes in the power industry.

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Rao Konidena's avatar

Lynne – I really liked this post. It resonated with me because I’ve been thinking a lot lately about why both MISO and PJM don’t have more battery storage.

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